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Abstract 
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1 Introduction
A well-functioning judicial system is essential in ensuring the enforcement
of contracts and the protection of property rights. The importance of the
quality of the judicial system for the working of market economies has been
conﬁrmed by a large body of empirical literature. For instance, it has been
shown that judicial eﬃciency aﬀects the development of ﬁnancial and credit
markets (Djankov et al., 2008), the availability and cost of credit (e.g. Bae
and Goyal, 2009; Qjan and Strahan, 2007; Fabbri, 2010), the volume of trade
(Berkowitz et al., 2006), sectoral specialization (Nunn, 2007) and competi-
tion in markets (Johnson et al., 2002).
In this paper we empirically investigate the relationship between judicial
eﬃciency and ﬁrm size. In shaping the contractual environment in which
ﬁrms operate, the judicial system may aﬀect ﬁrms' choices regarding, among
others, investments, employment, organizational models, contractual rela-
tionships with counterparts; all these aspects aﬀect ﬁrms' size and, ulti-
mately, aggregate employment.
In our analysis we employ a spatial discontinuity design to provide ev-
idence of a causal eﬀect. The identiﬁcation strategy consists in restricting
the sample to observations which are located nearby a spatial discontinuity
aﬀecting only the variable of interest and mean-diﬀerentiating all the vari-
ables within the group of observations which share the same discontinuity
(see, among others, Black, 1999; Holmes, 1998, Duranton et al., forthcom-
ing). We apply it to Italian municipalities exploiting spatial discontinuities
in tribunals' jurisdiction. In particular, we compare average ﬁrm size in
manufacturing across contiguous municipalities that are located on tribunal
jurisdiction borders: this allows us to isolate the eﬀects of judicial eﬃciency
as municipalities on opposite sides of tribunal boundaries experience a dis-
crete jump in this variable, but not in other unobserved factors. We use as
a measure of judicial eﬃciency the average length of trials in tribunals.
We ﬁnd that less eﬃcient tribunals lead to smaller average ﬁrm size.
These results are robust to the inclusion of additional controls at municipality
level and to the use of diﬀerent measures of judicial ineﬃciency and average
ﬁrm size. The economic impact of our results is relevant: halving the length
of civil proceedings would lead to a 8-12 per cent increase in average ﬁrm
size. We also ﬁnd that judicial ineﬃciency has a negative eﬀect on total
employment but does not aﬀect the number of ﬁrms, we interpret these
result as an indication of the fact that slow tribunals hinder ﬁrms' growth
but do not aﬀect ﬁrms' entry.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide evidence on the eco-
2
nomic impact of judicial eﬃciency in isolation from other institutions, both
formal and informal. Previous studies on this topic, based on cross-country
analysis, have employed either broad measures of quality of the legal system
that do not distinguish between the content of the laws and their enforcement
in courts (e.g. Kumar et al., 2001) or direct measures of courts' performance
(e.g. Beck et al., 2006). In both cases these measures may reﬂect other
(unobserved) features of the institutional setting of a country. The omitted
variable issues are less severe in within-country studies where it is possible
to discriminate between laws (that are uniform in the country) and their
enforcement that may vary due to diﬀerences in the actual functioning of
courts (Laeven and Woodruﬀ, 2007; Fabbri, 2010). Nevertheless, also in this
setting identiﬁcation issues may arise due to within-country variation in in-
formal institutions (unwritten norms and rules that aﬀect the behaviors of
individuals and organizations). As established in several studies following
the seminal work of Putnam (1993), informal institutions vary widely across
Italian regions and they produce signiﬁcant economic eﬀects (e.g., Guiso et
al., 2004). Moreover, two recent studies show that they aﬀect both the func-
tioning of the judicial system (Giordano et al., 2010) and ﬁrm size (Cingano
and Pinotti, 2011). Our identiﬁcation strategy allows us to disentangle the
eﬀects of judicial eﬃciency (that changes in a discrete manner) from both
the eﬀects of substantive written laws (that do not change) and informal
rules (that changes smoothly and are diﬃcult to identify).
This paper also contributes to the debate on the determinants of small
ﬁrm size in Italy. Compared to other European countries (UE-15) the size of
Italian ﬁrms is on average 40 per cent smaller; signiﬁcant disparities persist
even if diﬀerences in sectoral specialization are accounted for. Small ﬁrm
size is widely held to be a weakness of the Italian productive system and
one of the causes of the low productivity growth experienced by the Italian
economy in recent years; this is mainly due to the diﬃculties that small ﬁrms
face in innovating and competing in foreign markets (Banca d'Italia, 2009).
Although growth theory does not provide unambiguous predictions on the
relationship between ﬁrm size distribution and growth (Peretto, 1999), a pos-
itive association has been found in empirical studies (Pagano and Schivardi,
2001; Acs et al., 1999). At the same time judicial eﬃciency in Italy is very
poor: according to the World Bank's "Doing Business" report, Italy ranks
157 out of 183 countries in the enforcing contracts indicator. This is largely
due to the extreme length of judicial proceedings. In Italy it takes 1,210 days
to resolve a commercial disputes through courts; it is about four times the
number of days needed in the US and three times the number of days needed
in UK and in Germany. Previous studies on the eﬀects of poor judicial ef-
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ﬁciency in Italy have focused on the functioning of credit markets (Jappelli
et al., 2005; Fabbri and Padula, 2004; Magri, 2010). Our paper shows that
this ineﬃciency has also a negative impact on growth opportunities of Italian
ﬁrms.
The paper is organized as follows: the next session brieﬂy reviews the
related literature and sketches the channels through which justice eﬃciency
may aﬀect ﬁrm size; the third section describes the empirical methodology;
the fourth presents the results, and the ﬁfth concludes.
2 Related literature
Previous empirical studies ﬁnd a positive association between the quality of
the judicial system and ﬁrm size, though they do not provide evidence of the
existence of a causal relationship. Kumar et al. (2001) using data on ﬁrm
size in Western European countries ﬁnd that better judicial systems are asso-
ciated with larger average ﬁrm size; the eﬀects are bigger for industries where
physical assets are less important. Beck et al. (2006) using ﬁrm level data
on the largest industrial ﬁrms in 44 countries ﬁnd that ﬁrm size is positively
associated with institutional development (including judicial eﬃciency) and
with the development of ﬁnancial intermediaries. The link between ﬁrm size
and judicial eﬃciency has also been proved exploiting within country varia-
tion in the functioning of courts. Laeven and Woodruﬀ (2007) using census
ﬁrm data in Mexico show that judicial eﬃciency has a positive link with
average ﬁrm size and that this eﬀect is larger for proprietorship than for
corporations. Similar results are obtained by Fabbri (2010) on Spanish data;
she ﬁnds that more eﬃcient courts are associated with larger ﬁrms and less
costly bank ﬁnancing.
Various channels through which the eﬃciency of the judicial system may
aﬀect ﬁrm size are identiﬁed in the literature; all of them bear on the fact
that lengthy trials reduce contract enforceability.
First, an ineﬃcient judicial system aﬀects ﬁrm size through investment
decisions by entrepreneurs. Since poor contract enforcement increases the
risks faced by entrepreneurs and raises the expected return, this can lead to
less investment and reduce growth opportunities.
Second, the functioning of courts inﬂuences the employment decisions
of ﬁrms as it aﬀects the enforcement of employment protection legislation
(EPL). Although the literature has not reached clearcut conclusions on the
relationship between EPL and ﬁrm size, it can be argued that the potential
constraints EPL imposes on ﬁrms' growth depend on its actual implementa-
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tion through courts. For instance, in Italy the length of judicial proceedings
on worker dismissal directly translate into higher ﬁring costs for ﬁrms with
more than 15 employees: if a dismissal is ruled to be unfair, ﬁrms have to
compensate employees for the forgone wages in the time elapsing between
the dismissal and the court's sentence.1
Third, as poor contract enforcement determines higher transaction costs,
ﬁrms may respond vertically integrating their production process, thus in-
creasing their size.
Fourth, if formal contract enforcement institutions are not eﬃcient, par-
ties rely more on relational contracting and are less willing to work with
new partners; this reduces the demand for a given ﬁrm's output and hinders
its growth. Yet, the overall eﬀect on average ﬁrm size is ambiguous as rela-
tional contracting also creates barriers to entry for new ﬁrms that are usually
smaller than incumbent ﬁrms, thus reducing average ﬁrm size (Johnson et
al., 2002).
Finally, ﬁrm size can be indirectly inﬂuenced through the credit chan-
nel. Well functioning judicial systems, providing stronger creditors protec-
tion, increase the availability of credit and improve the contractual terms
for prospective borrowers, thus lessening ﬁnancial constraint to growth for
existing ﬁrms. Yet, also in this case, the overall eﬀect of a more eﬃcient
credit market on average ﬁrm size is ambiguous: since also prospective en-
trepreneurs would have better access to external ﬁnance and usually new
ﬁrms are smaller, this could reduce the average size.
To summarize, the ﬁrst and second channel imply that justice has a neg-
ative impact on average ﬁrm size, the third channel suggests a positive eﬀect,
while the overall impact of the remaining channels is ambiguous since the
eﬀect is negative on both incumbents' growth and entry rate. Therefore,
existing theories do not provide a deﬁnitive answer on the sign of the rela-
tionship between judicial eﬃciency and average ﬁrm size; thus, the question
needs an empirical answer.
3 Identiﬁcation strategy
Our identiﬁcation strategy is based on a spatial discontinuity design, in-
troduced by Black (1999) and applied by Holmes (1998) and Duranton et
al. (Forthcoming), among others.2 The methodology consists in restricting
1Besides the reinstatement of the employee, unless she or he opts for a further severance
payment equal to 15 months of salary.
2Black (1999) applies the methodology to housing prices as a function of school quality
in the U.S., by comparing the diﬀerence in prices of similar neighbouring houses located
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the sample to observations which are located nearby a spatial discontinu-
ity aﬀecting only the variable of interest, and in mean-diﬀerentiating all the
variables within the group of observations which share the same disconti-
nuity. Two are the crucial assumptions behind this approach: 1) spatial
discontinuities aﬀecting the variable of interest should not introduce any
sharp discontinuity in other variables; 2) the spatial border should introduce
a sharp discontinuity in the variable of interest.
We apply this methodology to a sample of Italian municipalities located
along tribunal jurisdiction borders, the outcome variables being ﬁrm size and
growth. We restrict the sample only to municipalities located along a juris-
diction border, and we then regress the outcome variable on the eﬃciency
of the local tribunals and a border dummy. The fact that our identiﬁcation
only exploits mean-diﬀerences among municipalities which are very close to
each other implies that our estimates are not biased by omitted local fac-
tors. Figure 1 and 2 show municipalities borders (gray lines) and tribunal
jurisdiction borders (bold black lines) in Northern Italy, while coloured ar-
eas indicate municipalities that share common jurisdiction borders. In a
nutshell, our approach consists in restricting the sample to coloured munic-
ipalities, and mean-diﬀerentiating all the variables among municipalities of
the same colour (by including a group dummy).
at diﬀerent sides of schools districts. Holmes (1998) instead exploits spatial variation in
US State legislations to ﬁnd that there is a large increase in manufacturing activity when
one crosses a state border from an antibusiness state into a probusiness state. Duranton
et al. (Forthcoming) use municipalities border in the U.K. to investigate the eﬀect of local
taxation on ﬁrm location and growth.
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Figure 1: Tribunals' jurisdiction, North Italy
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Figure 2: Tribunal jurisdiction, North Italy, detail
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Our setting ﬁts well the assumptions required by the identiﬁcation strat-
egy. As regards the ﬁrst assumption, the territorial organization of the Ital-
ian judicial system is based on 165 tribunal jurisdiction areas (circondari di
tribunale); within these areas, tribunali are the ﬁrst-instance courts both for
civil and criminal justice. The current territorial distribution of courts has
been mainly determined by historical factors: it largely resembles the one
shaped in 1865, right after the uniﬁcation of the country, which in turn was
set on the basis of the court systems of pre-existing states. Since then, no
existing jurisdiction has ever been removed, although a few new tribunali
have been lately carved out within the existing classiﬁcation.3 This system
is widely recognized to be ineﬃcient and anachronistic - due to the pres-
ence of a large number of very small courts whose diﬀusion might have been
necessary in the past to ensure access to justice, but which nowadays is not
justiﬁed - and, after a long lasting debate and strong opposition at local
level, it will undergone a major revision during 2012.
Tribunal jurisdiction areas do not systematically match other adminis-
trative territorial classiﬁcations, though in some cases tribunal boundaries
coincide with regional and provincial boundaries.4 In these circumstances
spatial discontinuities not related to the eﬃciency of justice might be intro-
duced. This would be a cause of concern only if these discontinuities were
correlated with tribunal eﬃciency. However, this is unlikely to occur since
the judicial system is fully autonomous from local administrative bodies and
Regions and Provinces do not have competences in the functioning of local
tribunals.
Nonetheless, since Regions have relevant regulatory powers on economic
activity, we control for regional diﬀerences on opposite sides of tribunal ju-
risdiction borders adding regional ﬁxed eﬀects in the regressions. We are less
concerned about the coincidence of tribunal borders with provincial borders
as, unlike Regions, Provinces have very limited autonomous power and their
main competences are in subjects with little impact on business activities.5
Still, in the robustness section we exclude from the sample all the tribunal
jurisdictions whose borders coincide with the provincial ones.
As regards the second assumptions, neighboring tribunals show signiﬁ-
3Over the last 50 years, 11 new small tribunali have been established (ﬁve in the '60s
and six in the '90s). As we will discuss later, our results are unaﬀected by the exclusion
of these tribunals.
4Regions and Provinces are the administrative territorial units which correspond re-
spectively to level 2 and level 3 in the Eurostat NUTS classiﬁcation.
5Such as environment protection, roads maintenance, schools (buildings construction
and maintenance), waste disposal.
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cant diﬀerences in eﬃciency. As we can see from Figure 3, which maps the
average estimated trials length by jurisdiction in the period 2002-2007, al-
though there is a clear geographical component in the index value (with
Southern tribunals on average twice as slow as Northern ones), there is
enough variation even within regions and between neighbouring tribunals.
Furthermore, since civil proceedings are assigned to courts on geographi-
cal bases, the spatial variation in tribunal eﬃciency leads to spatial variation
in judicial eﬃciency for local ﬁrms. As a general rule, the Italian civil pro-
cedure code provides that cases are assigned to tribunals according to the
residence of the law-suited subject, unless parties agree otherwise in a con-
tract. This implies that if a ﬁrm sues an insolvent customer and there is
not a previous agreement on a diﬀerent forum, the residence of the customer
determines the jurisdiction of the tribunal. In these cases, it is not possi-
ble to establish once and for all which is the relevant tribunal. However,
in certain matters, some of which are very relevant for ﬁrms' activity, the
tribunal's jurisdiction is always determined by the residence of the ﬁrm, ir-
respective of whom is initiating the legal action, for instance in labor and
bankruptcy proceedings. Consequently, crossing a jurisdiction border does
correspond to a sharp discontinuity in the average duration of at least some
types of proceedings potentially involving a given ﬁrm. Yet, as not all the
proceedings in which a given ﬁrm is a part are held in the local tribunal, it
is worth stressing that our analysis assess the eﬀect of the eﬃciency of the
local tribunal, not of the national judicial system as a whole.
3.1 Econometric speciﬁcation
A simple formalization may help understanding the econometric properties
of the methodology. We are interested in assessing the eﬀect of tribunal eﬃ-
ciency on the average ﬁrm size at municipality level (and on related outcome
variables). We are thus estimating the following model:
yi,p = Ek,pβ +Xiγ + f(p)δ + εi (1)
i.e., average ﬁrm size y in municipality i in the hypothetical 'place' (an
unique point in the space) p is a function of the eﬃciency E of the tribunal
k in the same place p, and of a vector X of observable characteristic of
municipality i. The function f(p) represents unobserved factors inﬂuencing
the outcome variables which vary across space, and potentially correlated
with both E and X. In such a setting, our estimates of β is biased. In theory,
we could obtain unbiased estimates by diﬀerentiating across observations
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Figure 3: Tribunal jurisdiction and trials average length, 2002-2007
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located in the same place p:
yi,p − yj,p = (Ek,p − Ek,p)β + (Xi −Xj)γ + [f(p)− f(p)]δ + εi − εj (2)
This model is however useless, as our variable of interest (the variation in E)
is always zero. But we can take a reasonably small variation of p next to a
tribunal area border, from p1 to p2, leading to a change in the tribunal area
eﬃciency, from Ek to Eq. If the following condition holds:
Corr((f(p1)− f(p1)), (Ek − Eq)) = 0 (3)
i.e., the change in the local unobservables in the two contiguous place is
uncorrelated with the change in tribunal eﬃciency, the estimate of β is un-
biased.
Another useful feature of this approach is the following: we can assume
that the side of the border (S=0 or S=1) where the municipality is located
is uncorrelated with its observable characteristics X :
E[X|S] = E[X] (4)
which implies that, on average, municipalities on one side of the border are
similar to municipalities on the other side. This also implies that adding
additional controls to our speciﬁcations may increase the eﬃciency of the
estimate of the tribunal eﬀect, but does not aﬀect the consistency (and the
value of the point estimates).
Operationally, we estimate the following model by OLS, restricted to the
sample of municipalities contiguous to a tribunal border b:
ymjb = Ejβ +Xmγ +
B∑
b=1
δb + εmjb (5)
where
• ymjb is a measure of average ﬁrm size, total employment, or total num-
ber of ﬁrms in municipality m, located in jurisdiction j, and belonging
to the border group b
• Ej is a set of eﬃciency measures of jurisdiction j
• Xm is a set of municipality controls
• δb is a full set of border group dummies (equal on both sides of the
border).
12
We identify 377 diﬀerent border groups (the colored areas in ﬁgure 1). In
order to minimize arbitrariness and to allow replicability, their composition
results from a completely automated procedure through a Geographic Infor-
mation System (GIS).6 On average, they comprehend 10 municipalities each,
with a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 64. All the results we present are
robust to the exclusion of border groups with more than 10 municipalities.
3.2 Other identiﬁcation challenges
There are a few additional challenges to our identiﬁcation strategy.
The ﬁrst one relates to sorting of plants. If ﬁrms choose their location
after observing the eﬃciency of the local tribunal, and if larger ﬁrms expect
to beneﬁt more from faster tribunals, then part of the eﬀect we ﬁnd is not
due to a growth-enhancing eﬀect of justice eﬃciency, but rather to an at-
traction eﬀect. However, if sorting were driving our results, we would not
ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁrms' growth, but only on ﬁrms' average size.
We anticipate, however, that this is not the case, the two set of results being
extremely similar. In the robustness section we address a related concern,
i.e., the possibility that border municipalities with faster (slower) tribunals
have more (less) large plants than non-border municipalities within the same
tribunal jurisdiction, due to cross-border sorting of plants among municipali-
ties belonging to the same border group. This would lead to an overestimate
of the real eﬀect, but our test suggests that this is not the case.
To the extent that larger ﬁrms increase the local demand for civil justice,
reverse causality might also appear as a potential source of bias. This would
deﬁnitively be an important limit in a standard OLS regression, suggesting
that we may ﬁnd a positive bias in our inconsistent, full sample regressions.
However, the spatial discontinuity approach is also robust to reverse causal-
ity: there is no reason why the local demand for justice should vary discon-
tinuously across jurisdiction borders. Therefore, the border group dummy is
fully absorbing the reverse causality eﬀect. In other words, if assumption 1
is veriﬁed, i.e., tribunal jurisdiction borders are truly exogenous, then risks
of reverse causality can be ruled out for our consistent estimates.
6For each municipalities, we ask the GIS to identify all jurisdiction polygons at zero
distance from the municipality border. Border municipalities are those with 2 (or more)
jurisdictions at zero distance (the one the municipality belongs to, and the contiguous
one). If there are more than one contiguous jurisdictions, only one is selected, based on
the distance between the municipality and jurisdiction centroids. Each border group is
composed by all municipalities sharing the same couple of zero-distance jurisdictions.
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4 Data and variable deﬁnition
We assembled a dataset with data on judicial eﬃciency, ﬁrm size (employ-
ment and accounting based measures) in the manufacturing sector and con-
trols at municipal level.
4.1 Judicial eﬃciency
Data on the functioning of the judicial system are provided by the Italian
Ministry of Justice. Since data on the actual duration of civil proceedings
are not available, we use caseﬂow data to construct an index that proxies
the average length of proceedings (in years) which is calculated as follows:
Dt =
Pt + Pt+1
Et + Ft
(6)
where P are pending cases at the beginning the year t, F are the new cases
ﬁled during the year and E are the cases concluded with a judicial decision or
withdrawn by the parties during the year. This index provides an estimate
of the average lifetime of proceedings in a tribunal.7We consider two kinds
of civil proceedings: ordinary civil proceedings (which include disputes on
contracts, property law, tort, corporate law) 8 and labor proceedings. While
our focus is on the functioning of the civil justice, we need to control for the
eﬃciency of tribunals in deciding criminal cases since, as already pointed
out, the same court decides both for civil and criminal cases. For criminal
proceedings we use data on the actual duration which are available. Our
data cover the period 2002-2007 and we use the average value across the six
years.
We also use data on judicial proceedings to build a litigation index to
account for potential reverse causality issues between size and judicial eﬃ-
ciency: ﬁrms may be bigger in municipality where business activity is higher,
but in turn the latter variable may be positively correlated with tribunal's
workload and thus trial length. The index is calculated as the ratio of the
number of new cases in the period 2002-2007 over total jurisdiction popula-
tion in year 2001.
7This is the index used by the Italian Minister of Justice and by the Italian National
Institute of Statistics (Istat) to estimate the duration of proceedings when actual data are
not available. In the robustness section, we show that our results are consistent with the
use of a diﬀerent version of the index.
8Unfortunately, disaggregated data for each of these subjects are not available.
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4.2 Firm size
We ﬁrst measure ﬁrm size using data on employment. As we cannot rely on
unit based data, to calculate employment-based proxies we use the database
ASIA produced by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat) which
contains information, at municipal level, on the number of ﬁrms, the number
of plants, the number of employees and the distribution of ﬁrms and plants
by size bins. These data refer to the year 2008 and are available only for mu-
nicipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants, hence the sample is restricted
accordingly. We consider both ﬁrm and plant-level data. Since the majority
of Italian ﬁrms are mono-plant and plant-level data produce slightly more
precise results, in what follows we use plant-level data.
Our ﬁrst measure is the ratio between the total number of employees and
the total number of plants. However, this indicator can be misleading in the
presence of a large number of very small ﬁrms and as we are ultimately inter-
ested in assessing whether judicial ineﬃciency is an obstacle to the presence
of large ﬁrms, we also adopt an alternative measure, originally proposed by
Davis and Henrekson (1997) and later adapted by Kumar et al. (2001) to
data at the level of ﬁrm size bins, that places more emphasis on large ﬁrms.
Following Kumar et al. (2001), we use an employee-weighted average size
indicator (EWAS) that is calculated as follows:
EWAS =
n∑
bin=1
(
empbin
emptot
)
∗
(
empbin
firmsbin
)
(7)
Where empbin and emptot refers to total employment in the plant size
bin and in the sector, respectively, and firmsbin corresponds to the number
of ﬁrms (or plants) in the size bin. The size bins we used are those originally
deﬁned in the ASIA archive: 1-9, 10-19, 20-49, 50-99, 100-199, 200-499, 500-
999, 1,000-4,999, and more than 5,000.
Our measures of average size do not allow us to disentangle whether
judicial eﬃciency aﬀect growth's prospects of ﬁrms, ﬁrms' birth or both.
For instance, small average size may be due to a high entrepreneurship rate,
considering that newly born ﬁrms are generally smaller, rather than to the
lack of growth of older ﬁrms. In order to shed some light on these aspects, we
also estimate separately the eﬀects of judicial eﬃciency on total employment
and on the number of plants and we interpret average plant size and the
total number of plants as static proxies respectively for ﬁrms' growth and
ﬁrms' birth.9
9We use this indicator as reliable measures of ﬁrms' birth are not available in Italy.
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Summing up, we run the same model with four diﬀerent dependent vari-
ables (in logs): the average plant size, the employee-weighted average size,
the total number of plants, and total employment. When interpreting the
results, we should keep in mind that the diﬀerence of the log of total em-
ployment and total number of ﬁrms corresponds to the log of the average
plant size. Hence, we can sketch three main diﬀerent scenarios. First, justice
slowness has a negative and comparable eﬀect on both ﬁrms' growth and en-
try. In such a case, the coeﬃcients would be negative for the total number
of plants and total employment and insigniﬁcant for average size. Second,
justice slowness aﬀects only ﬁrms' growth, but not entry; in this case, the
coeﬃcients would be negative for average size and total employment and
insigniﬁcant for the number of plants. Third, the eﬃciency of justice has
a negative eﬀect on enty, but not on ﬁrms' growth: this would lead to a
negative coeﬃcient for the number of plants, to an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient
on total employment, and to a positive coeﬃcient for average size.
Accounting based measures of size are taken from the CERVED database
that contains balance sheet data for most Italian corporations. From this
dataset we construct a measure of ﬁrm size and a measure of ﬁrms' growth
both based on total turnover. More precisely, we consider the average value
of turnover of corporations at municipal level over two years10 for the two
periods 2008-2009 and 2001-2002. The average turnover value for the period
2008-2009 is our measure of ﬁrm size, while the growth rate between the
two periods is our measure of ﬁrms' growth. Furthermore, we keep in the
sample only mono-plant ﬁrms11 which survived for the whole period and, as
the data are quite noisy, we also dropped the ﬁrst and last centile of the ﬁrm
distribution of total turnover growth.
4.3 Local variables
Our dataset include a number of control variables at municipal level. As a
proxy for the size of the municipality we use the municipal population as
recorded in the Census data in 2001. To take into account the eﬀects of the
availability of skilled workers on ﬁrms' growth potential, we include the share
of high school graduates on population as a measure of local human capital.
High crime rates may discourage economic activity, hence birth and growth
10We average the value of turnover over a two-year period to smooth short term distur-
bances.
11In the CERVED archive there is not a plant identiﬁer, but only a ﬁrm one. Therefore,
it is not possible to correctly calculate to individual contribution to ﬁrm turnover of
diﬀerent plants.
16
of ﬁrms, and at the same time congest local tribunals; to take into account
these factors we include as a proxy for crime rates the ratio of reported
crimes over population. We include the share of non-Italian on population
as foreigner workers increase labour supply, especially in manufacturing. As
ﬁnancial development is an important determinant of ﬁrm size, we include
in our dataset the number of retail banking branches. In order to control
for tribunal congestion (and a possible reverse causality channel), we include
a measure of litigation intensity within the tribunal, expressed as the ratio
of the number of ﬁled proceedings in the period 2002-2007 over the total
population of the jurisdiction in year 2001. We ﬁnally include a measure of
local taxation on business real estates (Imposta Comunale sugli Immobili),
since this is the most relevant policy at municipality level which may aﬀect
plants' location choices and growth opportunities.
In table 2 we report the main descriptive statistics of the variables used
in the empirical analysis, either in the full and the restricted sample. As it
is possible to see, there are no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences among the
two groups. This suggests that the restricted sample of border municipali-
ties is representative of the the full sample of Italian municipalities. In the
regression analysis, all variables are expressed in logarithmic form.
5 Results
5.1 Employment
We ﬁrst estimate eq. 5 using employment-based measures of ﬁrm size.
Table 3 presents the inconsistent estimates, based on the whole sample
of municipalities and including all the control variables and regional ﬁxed
eﬀects. The coeﬃcient of the judicial eﬃciency variable for civil proceedings
(our main variable of interest) is insigniﬁcant in all the regressions. This is
likely to be due to the bias generated by positive reversed causality, as dis-
cussed above, or by omitted variables which positively correlate both with
ﬁrm size and length of proceedings; both would push toward zero the ex-
pected negative coeﬃcient. A possible omitted variable is the presence of
industrial districts associated with a smaller average ﬁrm size: to the extent
that districts are more frequent in areas with higher endowments of civicness
and better performing institutions, this may explain the bias toward zero.
The coeﬃcient of criminal justice is instead negative and highly signiﬁcant.
Table 4 shows the simplest version of the consistent model, obtained
by restricting the sample to those municipalities situated along a border
of tribunal jurisdictions, and by introducing a set of ﬁxed eﬀects for all the
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groups of municipalities sharing the same border. By identifying a very small
group of observations located in the same area, these ﬁxed eﬀects control for
a wide set of observable and unobservable factors, while still leaving within-
group variability in the judicial eﬃciency variables due to the change in
tribunal jurisdiction. Now the coeﬃcient of the length of civil proceedings
turns negative and signiﬁcant. The magnitude of the eﬀect is relevant. As
regressions are log-linear and coeﬃcients can be interpreted as elasticities,
our estimates imply that, halving the length of civil proceedings, average
plant size would decrease by around 8.5%. Since the slowest tribunal in the
top decile for eﬃciency (Trento) is roughly 1,4 times faster than the fastest
in the bottom decile (Nola), these results also indicate that moving from the
jurisdiction of the tribunal of Trento to the jurisdiction of the tribunal of
Nola would lead to a reduction in average plant size of 23%. This elasticity
value, however, has to be scaled in proportion to the tiny average size of
Italian plants, equal to 8,2 employees in our sample. Therefore, the absolute
eﬀect for the average plants moving from Trento to Nola is in the reason of
two employees.
The eﬀect of the length of judicial proceedings is even stronger when the
dependent variable is the EWAS index which place more weight on bigger
plants (the coeﬃcient in column 4 is three times as big as the coeﬃcient of
column 1, although the diﬀerence is not statically signiﬁcant).
The length of criminal proceedings is negative and signiﬁcant for average
plant size, though the coeﬃcient is smaller, while it is not signiﬁcant for the
EWAS index. The length of labour proceedings is not signiﬁcant for both
our measures of plant size.
As we also ﬁnd that the length of civil proceedings has a negative eﬀect on
total employment (col. 3) but does not aﬀect the number of plants (col. 2),
we interpret these result as an indication of the fact that judicial ineﬃciency
is an obstacle to ﬁrms' growth and not to ﬁrms' entry. Furthermore, these
results suggest that our estimates are not biased due to sorting of larger ﬁrms
into municipalities with more eﬃcient tribunals: indeed, if this were the case,
one would also expect a larger number of plants in those municipalities.
In (table 5) we presents the results obtained including in the regressions
a full set of additional controls - including regional ﬁxed eﬀects. As expected,
the inclusion of additional controls produces only minor changes in the point
estimates of the coeﬃcients of the variables of interest. Regional ﬁxed ef-
fects are generally signiﬁcant, but leave the tribunal coeﬃcients unaﬀected.
This is particularly supportive of the robustness of our methodology, since,
as already pointed out, Regions in Italy are the local authorities with the
strongest autonomy and decisional power in subjects which are relevant for
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business activity. As to other controls, they are generally not signiﬁcant with
the exception of the share of college graduates and, in the regression of the
EWAS index, population which have the expected signs. It is also interest-
ing to point out that our proxy of local taxation is not signiﬁcant for ﬁrm
size, while it is signiﬁcant and has a negative sign on the number of plants.
This is consistent with previous ﬁnding indicating that local taxes are more
eﬀective in the extensive margin, rather than in the intensive one, because
part of their eﬀect is capitalized into rents (Duranton et al, Forthcoming).
5.2 Turnover
In table 6 columns 1-3 the dependent variable is the average turnover level
in years 2008-9; the speciﬁcations mirror those of the regressions run using
employment-based measures. In particular, col. 1 presents the inconsistent
model estimated on the full sample, cols. 2 and 3 the consistent model,
without and with controls, respectively. The main results are conﬁrmed: the
point estimates are even larger, although standard errors are much higher.
This suggests that the eﬀect on turnover is bigger than on employment,
since balance sheet data are noisier and we should take into account also
attenuation bias from classic measurement error. The larger standard errors
also suggests that employment is a better proxy for ﬁrm size (or the ASIA
archive, based on the full sample of Italian ﬁrms, a better source for this kind
of analysis). Columns 4-6 presents the results of the estimations where the
dependent variable is turnover growth and the speciﬁcations are those of the
previous columns. There are some advantages in running these regressions.
First, by so doing we implicitly control for time-invariant unobserved factors
potentially correlated with average plant size. Second, as mentioned above,
it rules out a possible bias due to sorting of larger ﬁrms into municipalities
with faster tribunals, since we use a closed sample of ﬁrms (we exclude ﬁrms
which enter or exit during the whole period). Finally, we directly test the
eﬀect of judicial ineﬃciency on ﬁrm's growth. In this case, coeﬃcients are
remarkably similar to those of employment regressions, providing further
support to our interpretation that judicial ineﬃciency hinders ﬁrm's growth.
It also suggests that eﬀects on levels and on ﬂows are comparable, and that
measuring ﬁrm size with employment or turnover does not change the main
picture.
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5.3 Robustness checks
We run a series of robustness checks on our estimates, which leaves the main
results unaﬀected.
A ﬁrst concern is related to the possibility that border municipalities with
faster (slower) tribunals have more (less) large plants than non-border mu-
nicipalities in the same tribunal jurisdiction, due to sorting of plants among
municipalities belonging to the same border group. For instance, let's assume
that there is an industrial district (composed by several municipalities) with
a very friendly business environment, and a jurisdiction border is crossing
the district. Plants may want to marginally change their location and move
to the good side of the tribunal border, while still enjoying the positive
district business environment. The short move would eventually help plants
growth more. In our setting, this would lead to overestimating the eﬀect,
because border municipalities (included in the analysis) would have more
and larger plants than other non-border municipalities in the same tribunal
jurisdiction (excluded from the sample), although the eﬃciency of the local
tribunal is the same. Fortunately, there is an easy way to test this. If sorting
were in place, we would ﬁnd that border municipalities in the good (bad)
side, i.e., those where the local tribunal is faster (slower) than the in the
neighbouring jurisdiction, are endowed with larger (smaller) plants, on av-
erage, than non-border municipalities in the same tribunal jurisdiction. We
therefore deﬁne two binary dummy variables identifying border municipal-
ities located in the good and bad side, respectively. Using the full sample
of municipalities (border and non-border ones), we then regress our set of
independent variables on the two dummies, on the controls, and on tribunal
jurisdiction ﬁxed eﬀects. Results (table 7) show that, although the coeﬃ-
cients have the expected sign, they are never signiﬁcant, and rather small in
magnitude. We conclude that our results are not signiﬁcantly biased by this
kind of sorting.
Another cause of concern is the coincidence of tribunal and provincial
borders. To account for this we exclude from our sample the observations for
which tribunals and provincial borders are fully coincident. The results are
presented in table 8. Our main ﬁndings on the eﬀects of judicial ineﬃciency
are fully conﬁrmed as to the employment-based measures of average size,
while the estimations are less precise as to the EWAS index when additional
controls are included in the speciﬁcation, probably due to the smaller sample
size.
As we mentioned above, although the general shaping of tribunal areas
goes back to year 1864, 11 small tribunals have been added during the '60s
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and the '90s. We may worry that tribunals which were created more re-
cently would show endogenous borders: for instance, a politically inﬂuential
major may manage to get her municipality included within the more eﬃ-
cient tribunal, and her activism may also aﬀect the growth of local ﬁrms.
To test that, we exclude from the sample all border groups involving a tri-
bunal created after the 1960. Results unreported for brevity but available
from the author upon request - where almost identical to those of the main
regressions.
Further robustness checks are presented in table 9. In columns 1-3 we
estimate separate regressions for each kind of proceedings to account for
possible multicollinearity. Ineﬃciency in deciding civil disputes and crimi-
nal cases have a negative eﬀects on average ﬁrm size, while lengthy labour
proceedings do not aﬀect ﬁrm size. In column 4 we tackle concerns related
to the index used to approximate the length of proceedings. We build an
alternative index, originally suggested by Clark and Merryman (1976), based
on the following formulation:
D =
Pt+ F
E
− 1 (8)
where P are pending cases at the beginning of the year, F are the new
cases ﬁled during the year and E are the cases completed or withdrawn during
the year. The index is averaged across the six years we have data on (2002-
2007).12 The new index is correlated at 97% with the previous one, and
leads to almost identical results. Since an imprecise index may also introduce
a measurement error, and thus an attenuation bias in the estimates, we also
try to instrument the ﬁrst index with the second; to the extent that the
measurement error in the two indexes is uncorrelated, the IVE strategy is
consistent. The 2SLS coeﬃcient, however, is only 10% bigger (in absolute
value), suggesting that the component of the measurement error linked to
the choice of the index is negligible (results are not reported).
A further robustness test relates to possible outliers due to the presence
of a small number of extremely large plants in small municipalities (for in-
stance, the automotive industry plants in Italy are mainly located in small
municipalities). We therefore exclude from the calculation of all the depen-
dent variables the plants with more than 200 employees. Results, unreported
for brevity but available upon request, are not dissimilar to our main esti-
mates, albeit less signiﬁcant. A last point of concern is the large variability
in municipality population. Those in our sample span from a minimum of
12More precisely, we summed all the components over the whole period, and then we
calculated the index on the aggregate ﬁgures.
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5,062 to a maximum of 2,545,860, with a standard deviation of 72,566 and
a 95th percentile of 53,219. Dropping from the sample the municipalities
in the top 5% of population, however, leaves results unaﬀected. Weighting
the restricted sample by population gives very similar results, although less
precise (again, results omitted and available upon request).
6 Conclusion
We explore the eﬀect of justice (in)eﬃciency on the size of ﬁrms. Since
theory does not provide an ultimate answer on the expected sign of the rela-
tionship, we resort to empirics to shed light on the subject. We address the
identiﬁcation and causality issues by applying a spatial discontinuity design
to Italian municipalities, exploiting the fact that tribunal jurisdictions have
been shaped in the XIX century and are irrelevant for nowadays adminis-
trative geography. More speciﬁcally, we compare average ﬁrm size across
contiguous municipalities that are located on tribunal jurisdiction borders;
this allows us to isolate the eﬀects of judicial eﬃciency, as municipalities on
opposite sides of tribunal boundaries experience a discrete jump in this vari-
able, but not in other unobserved factors. We use as a measure of judicial
eﬃciency the average length of trials in tribunals.
We ﬁnd that in municipalities where civil trials are longer average ﬁrms
size in manufacturing industries is smaller. These results are robust to the
inclusion of additional controls at municipalities level (population, human
capital, ﬁnancial development, court workload) and to the use of diﬀerent
measures of judicial ineﬃciency and average ﬁrm size. The eﬀect of crim-
inal justice ineﬃciency on ﬁrm size is also negative, but smaller and less
signiﬁcant.
The economic impact of our results is relevant: reducing by the half the
length of ordinary civil proceedings would lead to about 8 to 12 per cent
increase in average ﬁrm size. We also ﬁnd evidence that judicial ineﬃciency
hinders ﬁrms' growth rather than ﬁrms' entry. This is consistent with previ-
ous evidence from Duranton et al., (Forthcoming), who ﬁnd that local taxes
produce the same eﬀects. The authors suggest that local factors are capital-
ized into rents only marginally for incumbent, due to mobility constraints;
instead new entrants are perfectly mobile and need to negotiate rents, there-
fore for them the capitalization of local factors is higher.
Though our data do not allow for direct testing of the channels through
which judicial ineﬃciency aﬀects ﬁrm size, our results indicate that the neg-
ative eﬀects on investment decisions, on the willingness to engage in relation-
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ships with new trading partners and on the cost and availability of external
ﬁnancing prevail over the incentive to expand by vertically integrating the
production process; we do not ﬁnd evidence of an eﬀect through EPL en-
forcement.
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Table 1: Summary of variable description
Variable deﬁnition Area Period source
Av. plant size Employment over number of plants Muncip. 2008 ASIA-ISTAT
Plants/pop. Number of plants over population Muncip. 2008/2001 ASIA-ISTAT
Empl/.pop. Employment over population Muncip. 2008/2001 ASIA-ISTAT
EWAS Av. plant size with greater weight on large plants Muncip. 2008 ASIA-ISTAT
(see sect. 4)
Av. turnover 2008-9 Average plant turnover Muncip. 2008-2009 CERVED
Turnover growth 2001-9 Plant turnover in 2008-9 over plant turnover Muncip. 2001-2009 CERVED
in 2001-2 divided by the number of surviving plants
Length civil Estimated length in days of civil cases Trib. jur. 2002-2007 Italian Ministry of Justice
(see sect. 4)
Length labour Estimated length in days of labour cases Trib. jur. 2002-2006 Italian Ministry of Justice
(see sect. 4)
Length criminal Estimated length in days of criminal cases Trib. jur. 2002-2007 Italian Ministry of Justice
(see sect. 4)
Population Total population residing Muncip. 2001 Census of Population 2001, ISTAT
in the municipality
Litigation rate Number of new cases over Trib. jur. 2002-2007 Italian Ministry of Justice
total population
Share of foreigners Non-Italian resident over Muncip. 2001 Census of Population 2001, ISTAT
total population
Bank branches Number of bank branches Muncip. 2001 Atlante Stastico Comunale, ISTAT
Share of graduates Hi-school graduates (diplomati) over Muncip. 2001 ISTAT
total population
Crime Number of reported crime over Muncip. 2004-2009 Italian Interior Ministry
total population
Local tax rate Muncip. Bank of Italy
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
VARIABLES Mean s.d. Mean s.d.
Sample All (2,163) Border (1,131)
Av. plant size 8.3 5.5 8.2 5.6
Plants/pop. 0.011 0.006 0.011 0.007
Empl/.pop. 0.1 0.095 0.1 0.094
EWAS 88 249 92 296
Average turnover 2008-9 6,291 19,687 6,114 12,221
Turnover growth 2001-9 1.4 0.74 1.4 0.85
Length civil 931 307 914 301
Length labour 718 297 725 309
Length criminal 299 152 311 161
Population 20,577 73,029 24,167 97,320
Foreigner share 0.021 0.015 0.021 0.015
Bank branches 10 42 12 55
Share of graduates 0.23 0.042 0.23 0.042
Nr of crimes/pop. 0.15 0.86 0.15 0.96
Litigation rate 0.0062 0.0019 0.0063 0.002
Local tax rate 6.2 0.68 6.3 0.68
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Table 3: Full sample of municipalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Av. plant size Plants/pop. Employment/pop. EWAS
Length civil 0.090 0.073 0.163 0.175
(0.058) (0.088) (0.113) (0.124)
Length labour 0.020 0.016 0.036 0.081
(0.039) (0.059) (0.073) (0.085)
Length criminal -0.094** -0.059 -0.153* -0.140
(0.045) (0.058) (0.084) (0.090)
Population 0.081*** -0.075*** 0.006 0.515***
(0.018) (0.015) (0.028) (0.039)
Litigation rate -0.006 0.079 0.073 -0.038
(0.041) (0.064) (0.080) (0.093)
Share of foreigners -0.002 0.075*** 0.073** 0.007
(0.021) (0.024) (0.036) (0.041)
Bank branches 0.001 0.125*** 0.126** 0.047
(0.034) (0.035) (0.060) (0.073)
Share of graduates 0.235*** -0.387*** -0.152 0.647***
(0.085) (0.086) (0.141) (0.175)
Crime -0.017 -0.017 -0.034 -0.015
(0.032) (0.034) (0.056) (0.068)
Local tax rate -0.128 -0.418*** -0.546*** -0.177
(0.099) (0.096) (0.156) (0.234)
Constant 1.874*** -2.239*** -0.365 0.204
(0.696) (0.823) (1.192) (1.294)
Observations 2,185 2,185 2,185 2,185
R-squared 0.444 0.497 0.554 0.387
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables are in logarithms.
All regressions include regional ﬁxed eﬀects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Border municipalities, without additional controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Av. plant size Plants/pop. Employment/pop. EWAS
Length civil -0.175** -0.107 -0.282* -0.476**
(0.080) (0.099) (0.157) (0.196)
Length labour -0.016 0.096* 0.080 0.002
(0.041) (0.056) (0.082) (0.084)
Length criminal -0.108** -0.045 -0.153 -0.149
(0.048) (0.068) (0.098) (0.123)
Constant 3.601*** -4.325*** -0.723 7.259***
(0.631) (0.716) (1.154) (1.490)
Observations 1,061 1,061 1,061 1,061
R-squared 0.624 0.658 0.715 0.499
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables are in logarithms.
All regressions include border group ﬁxed eﬀects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Border municipalities, with additional controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Av. plant size Plants/pop. Employment/pop. EWAS
Length civil -0.221** -0.112 -0.333* -0.503**
(0.103) (0.112) (0.187) (0.227)
Length labour -0.012 0.089 0.077 0.024
(0.045) (0.060) (0.089) (0.101)
Length criminal -0.133** -0.009 -0.142 -0.133
(0.056) (0.069) (0.104) (0.132)
Population 0.043 -0.057** -0.014 0.442***
(0.028) (0.023) (0.044) (0.061)
Litigation rate 0.011 0.047 0.058 -0.114
(0.049) (0.068) (0.096) (0.127)
Share of foreigners 0.025 0.072* 0.096* 0.056
(0.045) (0.040) (0.055) (0.096)
Bank branches 0.048 0.127** 0.175* 0.155
(0.069) (0.049) (0.097) (0.143)
Share of graduates 0.341* -0.547*** -0.206 1.137***
(0.177) (0.139) (0.227) (0.384)
Crime -0.025 0.027 0.001 -0.070
(0.061) (0.064) (0.099) (0.133)
Local tax rate 0.046 -0.521*** -0.476* -0.060
(0.185) (0.150) (0.256) (0.422)
Constant 4.451*** -2.168* 2.283 5.126**
(1.227) (1.269) (2.055) (2.439)
Observations 1,019 1,019 1,019 1,019
R-squared 0.644 0.697 0.726 0.592
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables are in logarithms.
All regressions include regional and border group ﬁxed eﬀects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Eﬀect on turnover: level and growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Average turnover 2008/09 Av. turnover growth 2001-09
Sample All Border Border All Border Border
Av. turnover 2001/02 -0.025 -0.050*
(0.016) (0.028)
Length civil 0.049 -0.408* -0.371 0.061 -0.223** -0.187*
(0.128) (0.233) (0.250) (0.053) (0.086) (0.103)
Length labour 0.076 0.018 0.053 0.031 -0.036 -0.019
(0.077) (0.139) (0.140) (0.029) (0.049) (0.055)
Length criminal -0.176* -0.366** -0.266 -0.017 -0.116 -0.152
(0.096) (0.155) (0.180) (0.032) (0.088) (0.111)
Litigation rate 0.060 0.087 -0.022 0.010
(0.089) (0.134) (0.032) (0.065)
Population 0.236*** 0.182*** 0.030** 0.010
(0.037) (0.047) (0.012) (0.025)
Share of foreigners 0.086* 0.181* -0.023 0.028
(0.044) (0.100) (0.016) (0.040)
Bank branches 0.146* 0.210 -0.003 -0.022
(0.078) (0.139) (0.031) (0.067)
Share of graduates -0.105 0.121 -0.074 -0.098
(0.192) (0.424) (0.066) (0.166)
Crime -0.055 -0.089 -0.009 0.013
(0.059) (0.131) (0.026) (0.045)
Local tax rate -0.491** -0.176 -0.132 0.204
(0.216) (0.436) (0.101) (0.178)
Constant 9.010*** 13.411*** 13.555*** -0.509 2.667*** 2.357*
(1.455) (2.128) (2.787) (0.582) (1.001) (1.304)
Observations 1,942 984 967 1,942 984 967
R-squared 0.299 0.512 0.549 0.025 0.306 0.328
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables are in logarithms.
All regressions include regional and border group ﬁxed eﬀects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Robustness: sorting within jurisdictions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Av. plant size Plants/pop. Employment/pop. EWAS Av. turnover
growth 2001-09
badside -0.048 -0.027 -0.074 -0.077 0.014
(0.030) (0.032) (0.049) (0.067) (0.026)
goodside 0.015 0.038 0.053 0.045 0.026
(0.033) (0.035) (0.056) (0.071) (0.027)
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,051 2,051 2,051 2,051 1,942
R-squared 0.506 0.615 0.627 0.445 0.132
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables are in logarithms.
All regressions include regional and border group ﬁxed eﬀects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8: Robustness: excluding jurisdictions coinciding with provinces
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Av. plant size EWAS
Length civil -0.206** -0.283* -0.641*** -0.534
(0.091) (0.151) (0.225) (0.348)
Length labour -0.001 0.012 0.088 0.105
(0.074) (0.081) (0.157) (0.174)
Length criminal -0.137** -0.157** -0.327* -0.300
(0.067) (0.073) (0.172) (0.191)
Other controls NO YES NO YES
Observations 687 646 687 646
R-squared 0.632 0.669 0.538 0.643
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables are in logarithms.
Regressions in columns 2 and 4 include regional ﬁxed eﬀects.
All regressions include border group ﬁxed eﬀects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: Robustness: one variable at the time and alternative index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Av. plant size
Length civil -0.253**
(0.102)
Length labour -0.063
(0.045)
Length criminal -0.155***
(0.054)
Length civil -0.249***
(alternative index) (0.095)
Other controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,019 1,019 1,019 1,019
R-squared 0.642 0.640 0.642 0.642
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables are in logarithms.
All regressions include regional and border group ﬁxed eﬀects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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